Thursday, July 22, 2004
On Hiatus
For awhile. Too much work (the paying kind, that is).
For awhile. Too much work (the paying kind, that is).
Friday, July 16, 2004
Better Than Saddam
There's no shortage of bad news coming out of Iraq these days, but in a recent Baghdad dispatch, the Cairo Times' Steve Negus offers up a slightly more hopeful view. While the country may indeed be "falling apart at the seams," Negus writes, that may not be such a bad thing.
There's no shortage of bad news coming out of Iraq these days, but in a recent Baghdad dispatch, the Cairo Times' Steve Negus offers up a slightly more hopeful view. While the country may indeed be "falling apart at the seams," Negus writes, that may not be such a bad thing.
Iraq has little in the way of a national identity, and thus no central government will have much legitimacy. It may be best in the medium-term for the regions to form ties with the center as they need them, rather than the center force itself on the provinces. Although such a state may be weak, ridden with corruption and, in places, in thrall to tribal or religious mafias and political machines, it might still be an improvement on a Baathist-style tyranny.
Furthermore, in the long run—as civil society grows and the public becomes more politically sophisticated—it may prove more economically and politically dynamic than over-centralized states, where non-responsiveness to local concerns can prove paralyzing.For this to work there needs to be a national government regulated by nominally democratic rules, wherein regional bosses compete peacefully for their share of the federal pie. It could be derailed if Allawi or other leaders succumb to the temptation to exploit the security situation to perpetrate their stay in office. But, given the weakness of Iraq’s government and its desperate need for legitimacy, this scenario is unlikely. A more likely scenario would be a vicious circle—the bombings will prevent elections, but without elections the new government’s legitimacy will dwindle to the point that the regions simply ignore the central government—that could see Iraq heading toward failed statehood.
Or, it may be that Allawi and his colleagues will be able to prove the assertion that an Iraqi hand at the helm will resolve the country’s security woes. If that is the case, Iraq may move toward a government which, though far from perfect, will be much more democratic and responsive than any it has had in the past.
This vision -- of an Iraq more in line with the pseudo-democracies of, say, Mozambique, or Egypt -- is, of course, quite a ways from the rosy fantasies the White House peddled in the run-up to war, but it is undoubtedly better than life under Saddam was.
Furthermore, in the long run—as civil society grows and the public becomes more politically sophisticated—it may prove more economically and politically dynamic than over-centralized states, where non-responsiveness to local concerns can prove paralyzing.For this to work there needs to be a national government regulated by nominally democratic rules, wherein regional bosses compete peacefully for their share of the federal pie. It could be derailed if Allawi or other leaders succumb to the temptation to exploit the security situation to perpetrate their stay in office. But, given the weakness of Iraq’s government and its desperate need for legitimacy, this scenario is unlikely. A more likely scenario would be a vicious circle—the bombings will prevent elections, but without elections the new government’s legitimacy will dwindle to the point that the regions simply ignore the central government—that could see Iraq heading toward failed statehood.
Or, it may be that Allawi and his colleagues will be able to prove the assertion that an Iraqi hand at the helm will resolve the country’s security woes. If that is the case, Iraq may move toward a government which, though far from perfect, will be much more democratic and responsive than any it has had in the past.
The Toughest Guy
In Iraq, U.S.-appointed ruler Iyad Allawi is busily consolidating power. So far, he's threatened to declare martial law, crack down on the media, and seems intent on reconstituting the dreaded mukhabharat. Not all of this is, I think, is necessarily bad -- I can see the case for martial law, at least in the short term. Now, though, Allawi stands accused of executing detainees personally, in full view of Iraqi and U.S. witnesses.
In Iraq, U.S.-appointed ruler Iyad Allawi is busily consolidating power. So far, he's threatened to declare martial law, crack down on the media, and seems intent on reconstituting the dreaded mukhabharat. Not all of this is, I think, is necessarily bad -- I can see the case for martial law, at least in the short term. Now, though, Allawi stands accused of executing detainees personally, in full view of Iraqi and U.S. witnesses.
One of the witnesses claimed that before killing the prisoners Dr Allawi had told those around him that he wanted to send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents.
"The prisoners were against the wall and we were standing in the courtyard when the Interior Minister said that he would like to kill them all on the spot. Allawi said that they deserved worse than death - but then he pulled the pistol from his belt and started shooting them."
Re-enacting the killings, one witness stood three to four metres in front of a wall and swung his outstretched arm in an even arc, left to right, jerking his wrist to mimic the recoil as each bullet was fired. Then he raised a hand to his brow, saying: "He was very close. Each was shot in the head."
Australian journalist Paul McGeough, who has produced some of the consistently best Iraq reporting over the last year, broke the story yesterday, and follows it up with some useful background. "The prisoners were against the wall and we were standing in the courtyard when the Interior Minister said that he would like to kill them all on the spot. Allawi said that they deserved worse than death - but then he pulled the pistol from his belt and started shooting them."
Re-enacting the killings, one witness stood three to four metres in front of a wall and swung his outstretched arm in an even arc, left to right, jerking his wrist to mimic the recoil as each bullet was fired. Then he raised a hand to his brow, saying: "He was very close. Each was shot in the head."
But piled on a personal history that has too often lurched to the dark side, today's graphic witness accounts of summary executions by Allawi at a Baghdad police station challenge many assumptions about the man, and about where and how he might try to lead his beleaguered nation.
Surprisingly, few Iraqis professed to be shocked by the allegations. But why would Allawi do it? The answer is not so difficult in Iraq. If he could kill for Saddam when the former president was on the verge of power, wouldn't it come more easily if it would help Allawi cement his own grip on the levers?
Further, McGeough notes that denials from both Allawi and U.S. officials have been less than strenuous.
Surprisingly, few Iraqis professed to be shocked by the allegations. But why would Allawi do it? The answer is not so difficult in Iraq. If he could kill for Saddam when the former president was on the verge of power, wouldn't it come more easily if it would help Allawi cement his own grip on the levers?
Thursday, July 15, 2004
The Jordan Option
In Ha'aretz today, Meron Benvenisti confronts the idea that just won't die: the Jordan option.
In Ha'aretz today, Meron Benvenisti confronts the idea that just won't die: the Jordan option.
The advantages of the "Jordanian option" for Israel are so obvious as to obviate any need to delineate them, especially given the alternative - a binational state. The Jordanian option ostensibly neutralizes the demographic dangers, since all of the Palestinians can be transformed with mere words into "Jordanians," thereby "solving" the demographic problem.
It is also clear why the Jordanians object to this option so vehemently: It threatens to destroy, in one fell swoop, the internal Jordanian-Palestinian equilibrium that has been so painstakingly built; it is at odds with the king's policy, which might be expressed by the slogan "Jordan first;" and it exposes the regime to attacks from Islamist groups - not to mention Palestinian accusations of betrayal.
But the Jordanians are too weak to successfully contend with U.S.-backed Israeli schemes. Israel has the ability to create a situation in the West Bank that would threaten the stability of the Jordanian regime to such an extent that a certain type of "Jordanian involvement" would be less dangerous to the Jordanians than resisting involvement. And the Palestinians? They could soon find themselves facing an impossible situation: requesting annexation to Jordan, or alternatively - annexation to Israel. They might consider a besieged and segmented Palestinian state to be an even worse option.
As Benvenisti notes, outlandish as it is, the proposal keeps resurfacing in right-wing circles precisely because it's so appealing. This is the magical, silver bullet the "Eretz Israel" crowd has always wanted -- in one fell swoop, they'd close off hopes for a viable Palestinian state, solve Israel's demographic problem, and gain a bit of deniability on the occupation angle in the bargain. I can hear the Likudniks already: "The occupation is over, the Palestinians are now Jordanians!"
It is also clear why the Jordanians object to this option so vehemently: It threatens to destroy, in one fell swoop, the internal Jordanian-Palestinian equilibrium that has been so painstakingly built; it is at odds with the king's policy, which might be expressed by the slogan "Jordan first;" and it exposes the regime to attacks from Islamist groups - not to mention Palestinian accusations of betrayal.
But the Jordanians are too weak to successfully contend with U.S.-backed Israeli schemes. Israel has the ability to create a situation in the West Bank that would threaten the stability of the Jordanian regime to such an extent that a certain type of "Jordanian involvement" would be less dangerous to the Jordanians than resisting involvement. And the Palestinians? They could soon find themselves facing an impossible situation: requesting annexation to Jordan, or alternatively - annexation to Israel. They might consider a besieged and segmented Palestinian state to be an even worse option.
Tuesday, July 13, 2004
'Prince Joe Ebo,' meet 'Father Hector'
From the BBC: A British "scambaiter" manages to talk $80 out of a 409-scam artist. So how did he convince the scammer to part with his hard-earned cash? You'd think that 'Prince Joe Ebo' -- a guy who makes his living from email scams -- would be suspicious of any scheme that required him to send money to a total stranger. Apparently, though, greed trumps common sense:
From the BBC: A British "scambaiter" manages to talk $80 out of a 409-scam artist. So how did he convince the scammer to part with his hard-earned cash? You'd think that 'Prince Joe Ebo' -- a guy who makes his living from email scams -- would be suspicious of any scheme that required him to send money to a total stranger. Apparently, though, greed trumps common sense:
"I think it operates in much the same way as it does with real victims. Greed clouds their judgement. The guy obviously thought he was going to get $18,000 so easily, he was blinded by his own greed.
"Which is what happens to those who fall for the 419 scams; they just see all these millions."
"Which is what happens to those who fall for the 419 scams; they just see all these millions."
Sunday, July 11, 2004
What's in a Name?
Woo-hoo! We're number one!
Woo-hoo! We're number one!
IMMIGRATION is changing America's face, but not necessarily its name. When the Census Bureau unveils its list of most common surnames later this year, Smith is expected to remain in first place, as it has for at least half a century.
Friday, July 09, 2004
Halabja '88
Did Saddam really gas his own people? On first blush, the question seems a bit like asking whether Hitler ordered the extermination of the Jews during World War Two. Of course he did, seems the logical answer; only regime apologists would argue otherwise, right? Indeed, that Saddam waged war on Iraq's Kurdish population is undeniable, and George W. Bush's use of the 1988 Halabja massacre to justify our invasion ("This is a man who gassed his own people") was one of the few remaining examples of Iraqi offenses -- along with the brutal suppression of the Shia -- that still seemed airtight.
Now, however, come reports from an ex-CIA chief suggesting that Iran, not Iraq, gassed Halabja.
Did Saddam really gas his own people? On first blush, the question seems a bit like asking whether Hitler ordered the extermination of the Jews during World War Two. Of course he did, seems the logical answer; only regime apologists would argue otherwise, right? Indeed, that Saddam waged war on Iraq's Kurdish population is undeniable, and George W. Bush's use of the 1988 Halabja massacre to justify our invasion ("This is a man who gassed his own people") was one of the few remaining examples of Iraqi offenses -- along with the brutal suppression of the Shia -- that still seemed airtight.
Now, however, come reports from an ex-CIA chief suggesting that Iran, not Iraq, gassed Halabja.
The gassing of the Kurds has long been held to be the work of Ali Hassan al-Majid, named in the West because of that association as 'Chemical Ali'. Saddam Hussein is widely alleged to have ordered Ali to carry out the chemical attack.
The Halabja massacre is now prominent among the charges read out against Saddam in the Baghdad court. When that charge was read out, Saddam replied that he had read about the massacre in a newspaper. Saddam has denied these allegations ever since they were made.
While the CIA officer, Stephen C. Pelletiere, first went public with his revelations last year in a New York Times op-ed (and I remember Robert Dreyfuss mentioning them to me in a Mother Jones interview last spring), no one took much notice. They are likely to get another airing, though, when Saddam goes on trial next year. None of this makes Saddam a good guy, of course -- Human Rights Watch has decades of evidence on his crimes. But as Pelletiere noted last year, "There may be justifications for invading Iraq, but Halabja is not one of them."
The Halabja massacre is now prominent among the charges read out against Saddam in the Baghdad court. When that charge was read out, Saddam replied that he had read about the massacre in a newspaper. Saddam has denied these allegations ever since they were made.
Wednesday, July 07, 2004
Forward to Freedom?
In the last year or so, we've heard a lot about the Bush administration's "forward strategy of freedom." Supposedly, this White House has abandoned the morally bankrupt "realism" of its predecessors and embraced the radical notion of upending tyrannies and spreading democracy to the world -- especially the Middle East -- regardless of the consequences. This is, more or less, what Bush, Cheney, et al, argue about Iraq now that all of the other reasons -- WMD, Al Qaeda ties, etc. -- have been proven false. There's no evidence, though, that the White House actually means anything of the sort. After all, look at Uzbekistan, whom we've cozied up to since September 11. Look at Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Azerbaijan ... it's a long list. Sometimes the case can be made for supporting authoritarian regimes, of course, but as Josh Marshall notes, there isn't one case in which the Bush administration has sacrificed geopolitical aims (or perceived aims, anyway) for idealistic ends in which human rights and democracy take precedence. While Bush will undoubtedly keep talking up his wishes for the spread of democratization, it's pretty easy to spot the gap between words and deeds.
In the last year or so, we've heard a lot about the Bush administration's "forward strategy of freedom." Supposedly, this White House has abandoned the morally bankrupt "realism" of its predecessors and embraced the radical notion of upending tyrannies and spreading democracy to the world -- especially the Middle East -- regardless of the consequences. This is, more or less, what Bush, Cheney, et al, argue about Iraq now that all of the other reasons -- WMD, Al Qaeda ties, etc. -- have been proven false. There's no evidence, though, that the White House actually means anything of the sort. After all, look at Uzbekistan, whom we've cozied up to since September 11. Look at Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Azerbaijan ... it's a long list. Sometimes the case can be made for supporting authoritarian regimes, of course, but as Josh Marshall notes, there isn't one case in which the Bush administration has sacrificed geopolitical aims (or perceived aims, anyway) for idealistic ends in which human rights and democracy take precedence. While Bush will undoubtedly keep talking up his wishes for the spread of democratization, it's pretty easy to spot the gap between words and deeds.
Tuesday, July 06, 2004
The Black Jesus
Once banned and thought lost forever, Cape Town artist Ronnie Harrison's "Black Christ" -- which shows Hendrik Verwoerd crucifying ANC leader Albert Luthuli -- painting has resurfaced, and is now on display in SA.
Once banned and thought lost forever, Cape Town artist Ronnie Harrison's "Black Christ" -- which shows Hendrik Verwoerd crucifying ANC leader Albert Luthuli -- painting has resurfaced, and is now on display in SA.
